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A field experiment on dishonesty: A registered replication of Azar et al. (2013) 
 
Abstract 
This study is a registered replication of a field experiment on dishonesty by Azar et al. 
(2013). Their main finding was that most customers of an Israeli restaurant did not return 
excessive change; however, customers who received a higher amount of excessive change 
returned it more often than people who received a lower amount. Our study, which was 
conducted on a sample of customers of restaurants in the Czech Republic (N=219), 
replicated the results of the original study. The high excessive change condition increased 
the chance of returning the excess change by 21.7 percentage points (17.4 percentage 
points in the original study). The findings show that the psychological costs of dishonesty 
can outweigh its financial benefits. We similarly found that repeat customers and women 
were more likely to return the excessive change than one-time customers and men. The 
majority (70%) of customers in our sample returned the excessive change. We discuss the 
importance of field studies and replications of them in the further development of research 
into dishonest behavior.  
Keywords: Dishonesty, field experiment, pre-registered replication, customer behaviour 
JEL classification: C93, D12, D91 
 
1. Introduction 
This study is a registered replication of a field experiment on dishonesty carried out in an 
Israeli restaurant by Azar et al. (2013). They found that most customers did not return 
excessive change and, contrary to the expected hypothesis, customers who received a 
higher amount of excessive change returned it more often than people who received a lower 
amount. This result calls into question the simple economic prediction that people will be 
more dishonest if they can make more money by cheating (Gneezy, 2005). On the contrary, 
the findings corroborate theories that people do not evaluate material benefits and costs 
only. They also care about their moral self-esteem, and there is a limited magnitude of 
dishonesty that a person is willing to bear (Barkan et al., 2015; Cohn et al., 2019; Mazar et 
al., 2008). Stealing a small sum may be easily overlooked, rationalized or excused; on the 
other hand, customers may not be able to maintain a positive self-image when stealing a 
more substantial amount of money. The original study also confirmed the suspected 
antecedents of dishonesty, e.g., repeat customers returned the excessive change much 
more often than one-time customers and women returned it more often than men, especially 
among repeat customers. 
There are several reasons for the replication of the original field experiment. First, the 
current literature on determinants of cheating and the magnitude of it is inconclusive. Current 
reviews demonstrate that people behave differently in the laboratory and in the field and in 
different tasks or situations that are used by researchers to elicit cheating behavior (Gerlach, 
et al., 2019; Jacobsen et al., 2017; Rosenbaum et al., 2014). Findings from the laboratory 
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may not be generalizable to real-world settings and/or results of field experiments may be 
too contextually idiosyncratic. Second, studies focusing on naturally occurring situations that 
allow for cheating are rare. Their results cannot be systematically analyzed, which prevents 
the formulation of any conclusions regarding the magnitude or determinants of dishonesty in 
the field. A case in point is the influence of cultural norms; some studies have found that 
individual dishonesty is not culture-dependent and not correlated with institutional honesty 
(Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015), others have found the exact opposite (e.g., Fisman & Miguel, 
2007; Gächter & Schulz, 2016). Third, the replication crisis in the social sciences has 
showed that many of the published effects had been found by chance or due to the specific 
conditions of a study. A number of attempts to replicate seminal effects in the research on 
dishonesty have failed (Dimant et al., 2020; Kettle et al., 2017; Kristal et al., 2020; Schild et 
al., 2019; Verschuere et al., 2018). Therefore, an effect found in a single study should be 
viewed with caution. 
Nevertheless, our replication, which was conducted in two restaurants in the Czech 
Republic, largely confirms the results of the original study. The high excessive change 
condition increased the chance of returning the extra change by 21.7 percentage points 
(17.4 percentage points in the original study), and we also found that repeat customers and 
women were more likely to return the excessive change than one-time customers and men. 
In our sample, most customers returned the excessive change (in the original study, 66% of 
customers were dishonest; in our study, 70% of customers were honest). 
 
1.1 The need for replications of field experiments on dishonesty 
In order to determine the external validity and robustness of laboratory or survey results, 
field experiments must be performed (Harrison & List, 2004; Zitzewitz, 2012). Self-report 
measures are based on participants’ reflections on their behaviors across various real-life 
situations and naturally suffer from motivational biases. For example, Alem et al. (2018) 
showed a substantial difference between stated ethical behavior in a survey and revealed 
behavior in a field experiment. Laboratory measures elicit participants’ behavior in a novel, 
artificially structured environment and the findings may not be generalizable to a real-world 
situation (Levitt & List, 2007; Winking & Mizer, 2013). Field behavioral measures exploit 
participants’ responses in naturally occurring situations; however, they could be full of 
contextually rich confoundings (Gneezy & Imas, 2017; Hauser et al., 2017). 
Although several studies have presented links between dishonest behavior in the laboratory 
and in the field, this association is only weak or moderate at best (Dai et al., 2017; Franzen 
& Pointner, 2013; Potters & Stoop, 2016). Moreover, most of the experiments on dishonesty 
use samples of students, only a minority of studies are field experiments that have focused 
on dishonesty in everyday life (e.g. the lost wallet, the misdirected letter) or business 
transactions (e.g. fraudulent price discrimination, honour system payment, free riding on 
public transport). Field experiments are usually focused on the dishonesty of service 
providers in their interaction with customers (Balafoutas et al., 2013; Busse et al., 2017; 
Conrads, et al., 2015; Dugar & Bhattacharya, 2016; Vranka et al., 2019). There is a lack of 
studies that focus on customers' dishonesty in their interaction with sellers (for exceptions, 
see Bucciol et al., 2013; Potters & Stoop, 2016). Azar et al. (2013) is one of the few field 
 
4 
experiments that is interested in the dishonesty of customers in a common business 
transaction. Therefore, our replication contributes to this under-researched topic. 
There are certain antecedents of dishonesty that are common for various studies such as 
monitoring or intrinsic cheating costs, and other antecedents have been identified only in 
some experiments (Gerlach, et al., 2019; Jacobsen, et al., 2017; Rosenbaum, et al., 2014). 
As experimental studies have various procedures and different operationalizations of 
dishonesty, it is hard to determine whether the antecedent is context-determined (i.e. typical 
for a specific type of dishonesty, situation, sample, or culture) or has only been found by 
chance. Conceptual replications of laboratory experiments on dishonesty are quite common 
(see Rosenbaum et al., 2014). However, besides one study (Vranka, et al., 2019) which 
used an improved procedure similar to Rabinowitz et al. (1993) and Feldman (1968), we 
have not found any replication of a field experiment focused on dishonesty in an everyday 
business transaction. The replication of an original study is essential to provide further 
evidence about the effect on a different sample and in a different cultural environment.  
 
1.2 The need for the replication of studies with surprising results 
The experiment of Azar et al. (2013) was conducted on a homogenous sample (i.e. the 
guests of one Israeli restaurant) and has never been replicated. However, its conclusions 
are cited as being generally valid (see e.g., Abeler et al., 2014; Irlenbusch & Villeval, 2015). 
This confidence in the findings of a single experiment seems unwarranted as the replication 
crisis has showed that many of the published effects had been found by chance (Open 
Science Collaboration, 2015; Klein et al., 2018). In particular, attempts to replicate effects in 
dishonesty research have been unsuccessful on several occasions (Dimant, et al., 2020; 
Kettle, et al., 2017; Kristal, et al., 2020; Schild, et al., 2019; Verschuere, et al., 2018). 
 
Lindsay (2015) listed “a troubling trio” of factors leading to doubts about the reported effect 
and therefore increasing the need for further replication. One of these factors is that the 
study reported a surprising result. The effect of manipulation of the amount of excess 
change in the original study was surprising. It was in the opposite direction to that which the 
authors hypothesized and was not in line with previous research that showed either an 
opposite effect of stake size or temptation on dishonesty (Gneezy, 2005) or incoherent 
effects (Farrington & Kidd, 1977; Yuchtman-Yaar & Rahav, 1986). 
Our main goal was to replicate the main effect of the experimental manipulation that was 
found in the original study and the test of the following hypothesis: Customers who receive 
more excessive change return it more often than customers who receive less excessive 
change.  
In our replication study, we followed the original study and also observed some 
characteristics of customers (i.e., gender) and context variables (i.e. lunch/dinner) that had 
shown to be relevant predictors of the excessive change return rate in the original study. 
However, we did not state hypotheses about these variables and we only controlled for their 









We conducted the experiment in two restaurants in Brno, Czech Republic. Restaurant 1 is a 
large establishment close to the city centre specialized in burgers and traditional Czech 
cuisine. The restaurant can deliver around 50-70 meals at one time. Restaurant 2 
specializes in Indian cuisine and can deliver around 20-30 meals at one time. Most main 
dishes in both restaurants cost around 150-250 CZK (Czech crowns approximately 6–10 
Euros), which is similar to comparable middle-class restaurants in large Czech cities. On 
weekdays between 11 AM and 2 PM, discounted meals are available (for around 100 CZK 
per meal, which is approximately 4 Euros). Their typical customers are middle-class people 
between the ages of 20 and 60. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
During October 2019, waiters were asked to quasi-randomly return excessive change to 
customers who had paid their bill in cash. Waiters returned either an excess of 20 CZK 
(approximately 0.8 Euros) or an excess of 100 CZK (approximately 4 Euros). Waiters were 
asked to alternate the larger and smaller sums to customers who had paid cash (the original 
article does not state how the randomization was performed). In the original experiment 
waiters returned an excess of 10 Shekels (approximately 2.6 Euros) or 40 Shekels 
(approximately 10.5 euros). For our replication study, we calculated the amounts taking into 
account the CZK/Shekel exchange rate and the difference in price level between similar 
Czech and Israeli restaurants. In line with the original experiment, the aim was to ensure that 
the excess change was believable, rounded, and could easily be handled by the waiters. 
The waiters were given the instruction not to return excess change to participants who were 
clearly concentrated on other activities during the payment (e.g., making a phone call, in 
discussion with another person). 
The research was conducted throughout the week during the operating hours of the 
restaurant, from 11 am until 10 pm. As is typical in some Czech restaurants, customers paid 
at the bar. One of the researchers was sitting near the bar at the table, secretly observing 
the payment and recording several variables: whether it was lunch or dinner, the gender of 
the waiter, the gender of the customer, whether the customer was clearly concentrating on 
other activities during the payment, i. e. whether the customer was checking the returned 
change. 
After the customers had left the restaurant, the waiters recorded several variables: whether 
the excess change had been returned, if it was 20 or 100 CZK, whether the customer was 
visiting the restaurant for the first time or was a repeat customer (as far as they could 
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remember), and the value of the bill. The variables that the experimenter observed and that 
the waiters reported were the same as in the original experiment of Azar et al. (2013). 
 
2.3 Sample 
We observed payments from 221 patrons of the restaurants. We excluded two customers 
who did not even look at the change. Therefore, the final sample consisted of 219 guests 
who had paid in cash and had received excessive change from the waiter. Of the sample, 
120 (55%) received 20 CZK, and 99 received 100 CZK excess change. Following the 
preregistration, we stopped the data collection at the end of the day, shortly after we had 
reached 214 observations, as 214 observations allowed for testing 50% of the original effect 
size (i.e. d = .403) with 90% test power on alpha = .05. 
 
2.4 Variables 
We analyzed data on the seven variables shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Description of variables  
Variable Explanation 
Return 1 if the excessive change was returned, 0 if not 
High-change 1 if it was 100 CZK excess change, 0 if it was 20 CZK  
Repeated 1 if it was a repeated customer of the restaurant, 0 otherwise 
Weekend 1 if it was weekend, 0 otherwise 
Evening 1 if the order was made between 17:00 and 21:59, 0 if it was 
between 11:00 and 16:59 
Bill-per-person Price in CZK per person 
Woman-payer 1 if the bill was paid by a woman, 0 otherwise 
 
The variable Return is the dependent variable which indicates honest behaviour (the 
excessive change was returned) or dishonest behaviour (it was not returned). High-change 
is a manipulated experimental condition and refers to high (100 CZK) or low (20 CZK) 
excessive change that the guest received from the waiter. Other variables were observed by 
one of the researchers or a waiter. We observed and preregistered the same variables as 
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the original study except for variables which were not significant predictors of dishonesty and 
at the same time a) which could not be measured in the conditions of our experiment or b) 
which would be complicated to record during busy working hours. We focused on the main 
effect of High-change and controlled for variables that had shown to be relevant in the 
original study (Repeated, Woman-payer) and on the variables that were easy to observe. 
After the data collection had ended, we had to exclude from the analyses some variables 
that we had originally intended to observe due to their low variability. The first of these was 
the variable Male-waiter, as a male waiter had handled the payment in only 3 of the 219 
observations. The other excluded variables were multiple payers and bill sharing. In both 
restaurants, all the treated customers paid individually at the bar. Therefore, we did not 
observe multiple-payers or shared payments. 
 
3. Results 
3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 shows frequencies for all binary variables and the descriptive statistics for Return for 
each condition. 153 customers out of 219 (70%) returned the excess change. The proportion 
of customers who returned the excess change was higher in the high-change condition 
(80%) than in the low-change condition (62%). This difference was significant, t(217) = 3.01, 
p = .003, Fischer’s exact test statistic = .0048, p < .01. The average Bill-per-person was 
332.30 CZK (SD = 450.52). Customers who did not return the excess change spent slightly 
more (M = 354.61, SD = 630.94) than customers who returned the excess change (M = 
322.68, SD = 347.21), t(82.49) = .39, p = .700. 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of Return in various conditions 
  N M 95%CI 
Low change 120 62% 53% 70% 
High change 99 80% 72% 88% 
Total 219 70% 64% 76% 
Not repeated 143 66% 58% 74% 
Repeated 76 78% 68% 87% 
Total 219 70% 64% 76% 
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Workday 180 67% 60% 74% 
Weekend 39 82% 69% 95% 
Total 219 70% 64% 76% 
Lunch 171 68% 61% 75% 
Evening 48 75% 62% 88% 
Total 219 70% 64% 76% 
Man-payer 148 64% 56% 72% 
Woman-
payer 
71 82% 72% 91% 
Total 219 70% 64% 76% 
 
3.2 Hypothesis testing 
To test the hypothesis with control variables, we used the same linear regression model as 
Azar et al. (2013). We multiplied the dependent variable (i.e. Return) by 100, so the 
coefficients present the percentage increase in the probability of returning the excessive 
change. The model predicted Return of excess change significantly, F(6, 212) = 4.90, p 
<.001, and explained 12.2% of the variance. Our analysis provided very similar results to the 
original study. The high-change condition increased the chance of returning excess change 
by 21.7 percentage points (17.4 percentage points in the original study), and this effect was 
significant. Therefore, we successfully replicated the effect from Azar et al. (2013) as we 
found support for the hypothesis that customers who receive more excessive change return 
it more often than customers who receive less excessive change. 
 
Table 3. Linear probability model  
  
Full model   With moderation 
Variable B β p   B β p 
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Intercept 49.60  <.001  53.85   <.001 
High-change 21.69 .24 <.001  13.81 .15 .064 
Repeated customer 13.94 .14 .031  4.26 .04 .605 
Weekend 16.55 .14 .047  16.74 .14 .043 
Evening 13.67 .12 .095  14.39 .13 .078 
Bill-per-person -.02 -.16 .038  -.02 -.16 .034 
Woman-payer 15.50 .16 .016  13.49 .14 .037 
High-change * Repeated 
    
23.57 .18 .065 
Note. Model without moderation R2 = .122 (p < .001); ΔR2 = .014 (p = .065). 
 
3.3 Supplementary analyses 
As in the original study, we found effects for Repeated and Woman-payer as repeated 
customers and women returned the excessive change more often than one-time customers 
and men. We also found weak and barely significant effects for Weekend and Bill-per-
person, which were insignificant in the original study (see Table 3). 
Azar et al. (2013) also included in their model the interaction between High-change and 
Repeated. They found this interaction to be significant as the effect of High-change was 
stronger for repeated than for the one-time customer. We tested this effect in the second 
step of the regression model. As can be seen in Table 3, we found an effect in the same 
direction. In the low-change condition, one-time customers (61%) and repeated customers 
(63%) returned the excess change with a similar probability. In the high-change condition, 
only 71% of one-time customers but all repeated customers (100%) returned the money. 
This effect was significant only in a simple model with two predictors (i.e. Returned and 
Repeated, p = .038) but not in the full model (p = .065) due to the lower test power of the 
model with 7 predictors. Adding the interaction to the model suppressed the effect of 
Repeated (see Table 3) because the effect was marginal in the low-change condition. 
It is important to note that linear regression is not the most appropriate analysis for binary 
outcomes and we used it to compare our results with the results of the original study. 
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Therefore, we also present the results of logistic regression which showed the same effects 
and provided the same conclusions (see Table 4) as the linear regression. 
Table 4. Logistic regression 
Variable B p OR 
Intercept -.18 .512 .83 
High-change 1.24 <.001 3.45 
Repeated customer .80 .025 2.22 
Weekend 1.05 .042 2.87 
Evening .87 .069 2.39 
Bill-per-person .00 .024 1.00 
Woman-payer .92 .013 2.52 
Note. Naglekerke R2 = .182, OR odds ratios. 
 
4. Discussion 
We replicated the findings of the original study (Azar et al., 2013). In the high excessive 
change condition, customers were more likely to return the money than in the low excessive 
change condition. The result is in line with the explanation that a more substantial financial 
reward for dishonesty is associated with higher psychological costs and that these 
psychological costs outweigh the financial benefits (Barkan, et al., 2015; Cohn, et al., 2019; 
Mazar, et al., 2008). It could also be that with the higher excess change it is harder for 
customers to pretend that they did not return the money because of inattention. The possible 
gain from dishonest behavior might be outweighed by the higher perceived risk of revealing 
the dishonest behavior (Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017).  
 
Moreover, a higher amount of excessive change is also more visible, and there is a higher 
chance that a customer will notice it. This explanation is also supported by the fact that as 
the size of the bill increased, the probability that the customer returned the excessive change 
decreased. Nevertheless, we do not believe that inattention is the decisive reason for the 
findings. Repeat customers returned the large excessive change in all the cases whereas 
one-time customers did not. There is no reason to expect repeat customers to be more 
attentive; on the contrary, they are more likely to trust the restaurant. However, they could be 
expected to have higher costs associated with cheating, because they would not want to 
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return to the restaurant (or could not) after their cheating had been detected. Similarly, they 
are likely to have a more positive attitude towards the restaurant and, therefore, dishonesty 
would result in higher psychological costs. Nevertheless, it can be assumed that regular 
customers would also have a better idea of how much the meal cost and might be expected 
to have the exact amount of money ready to pay. The higher excess change would be more 
noticeable. 
 
In contrast to the original findings, in our sample, most customers returned the excessive 
change. Several factors may have caused this difference. In our experiment, customers paid 
at the bar, while in the original study, they paid at their table. Since the customer was alone 
with the waiter at the bar, we might expect the opposite effect due to fewer watching eyes. 
People standing at the bar also were required to make their decision immediately, whereas 
in the original study they had time to decide whether to return the excessive change while 
they remained seated at their table. According to the literature on default honesty, customers 
paying at a bar should be more honest (Capraro, 2019). Similarly, at the table, the paying 
customer may be being observed by other people, and therefore, the cost of that person’s 
dishonesty is higher. On the other hand, the presence of other people may help to justify the 
dishonest behavior through the diffusion of responsibility. Furthermore, personal proximity in 
the case of payments at the bar could elicit affinity and moral emotions (Greene et al., 2004) 
or the fear of revealing dishonesty (Kajackaite & Gneezy, 2017), both of which support 
honest behavior.  
 
Another factor is cultural differences (Pascual-Ezama et al., 2015; Gächter & Schulz, 2016). 
The Czech Republic is a post-communist country and it now ranks 44th in the Corruption 
Perceptions Index (the higher the country ranks, the lower are the perceived corruption 
rates) whereas Israel ranks 35th (Transparency International, 2019). Nevertheless, a 
laboratory study on a sample of Czech students revealed quite high preferences for honesty 
(Novakova et al., 2018). In any case, the number of field experiments is insufficient for any 
exact cross-country comparisons. Dishonesty research generally suffers from similar 
problems as most experimental economics: the studies are mostly conducted in ‘WEIRD’ 
countries (Henrich et al., 2010) and they are subject to severe publication bias (Gerlach, et 
al., 2019). 
 
We also found that women are more honest than men. These results fit into the systematic 
evidence that women behave slightly more honestly than men in most situations (Gerlach, et 
al., 2019; Jacobsen, et al., 2017). Furthermore, customers were more honest on a weekend. 
We might speculate that customers are in a better mood at the weekend and are therefore 
less inclined to steal. There are also fewer people in restaurants at the weekend and the 
customers might expect that the waiter would pay more attention to their payment. 
 
4.1 Limitations 
Our study was a close replication of the experiment of Azar et al. (2013). There were several 
differences between the two studies that originated from the distinctions between Czech and 
Israeli restaurants. Our aim was to replicate the main manipulation with excessive change in 
similar conditions, but in a different cultural context, controlling for the effect of variables that 
showed to be significant in the original study. The differences in payment (i.e., at the table or 
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the bar), the slightly larger differences between the high and low excessive change 
conditions and the reduced number of control variables in the analyses should be taken into 
consideration when comparing the results.  
 
It is not clear from the original study how the authors randomized the experimental condition. 
We were not able to enforce randomization, so we asked waiters to at least alternate the 
larger and smaller sums of excess change to customers who had paid cash. However, the 
waiters were not able to maintain this alternation regularly, especially during the busy hours, 
and returned the cash quasi-randomly. We believe that this did not seriously affect the 
results, as the waiters did not know the hypotheses and had no interest in the outcome of 
the study.  However, a possible unconscious bias on the part of waiters, could have affected 
the results. 
 
We conducted our experiment in two restaurants in one Czech city. Our sample was not 
large and representative enough to enable a broad generalization of our results. However, 
we found a similar effect to the original study, which indicates that the effect of high/low 
excess change might exist across cultures. However, further replications in various contexts 
are needed to support this conclusion. 
 
4.2 Conclusion 
Our replication, which was performed on a different sample in another country, yielded the 
same results as the original study. We successfully replicated the effect from Azar et al. 
(2013) as we found support for the hypothesis that customers who receive more excessive 
change return it more often than customers who receive less excessive change. However, 
the results may be explained by several alternative explanations; future research should 
focus on differentiating their effects. 
We argue that direct and conceptual replications are needed to understand the 
generalizability of the effects and potential antecedents of dishonest behavior (Pierce & 
Balasubramanian, 2015). Without field experiments and replications of them, there are few 
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